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Introduction
The imagery of movement is deeply engrained in devel-
opment discourse, and particularly in relation to poverty: 
we commonly talk, for example, of people moving ‘out 
of poverty’ or ‘up the asset ladder’. Nevertheless, these 
simple images hide what are now widely understood to 
be complex, non-linear and dynamic processes that are 
impacted by a bewildering array of factors from human 
agency and policy to the structure of the global economy 
and natural disasters. It is within this context that the 
potential role and contribution of social protection to 
poverty reduction must be understood. 
However, much social protection discourse and policy 
also articulate with images of movement through the 
concept of graduation. Again, the sense is of graduation 
as an orderly sequence of incremental steps – from a 
position of vulnerability where social protection is 
required, to one where it is not. The concept of gradua-
tion now sits at the heart of a number of large-scale social 
protection programmes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), of 
which the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP) is a prime example (Sabates-Wheeler and 
Devereux, 2011). Fundamental to most conceptions of 
graduation is the idea of progressive asset accumulation, 
giving rise to the notion of ‘asset-based graduation’.
In this paper we look at a well-established genre of 
livestock projects through the lens of asset-based gradu-
ation. Specifically we ask what can be learned about social 
protection and graduation from the experience of proj-
ects built around the ‘heifer-in-trust’ or ‘livestock-in-kind 
credit’ model that specifically target poor people. What 
does graduation look like?  Is there anything special about 
the ‘asset-ness’ of livestock in the context of social protec-
tion that either facilitates or constrains their contribution 
to graduation processes?
The next section provides a brief introduction to social 
protection with a particular focus on the links between 
social protection and agricultural development. 
Following this we review the concept of graduation as 
it relates to social protection. We then consider the char-
acteristics of livestock as livelihood assets before looking 
in detail at heifer-in-trust projects as an example of social 
protection – what can these projects tell us about gradu-
ation? We end the paper with a discussion of the implica-
tions for further empirical work. 
Social protection
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2007) define social 
protection to include ‘all initiatives that transfer income 
or assets to the poor, protect the vulnerable against liveli-
hood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of 
the marginalised; with the overall objectives of extending 
the benefits of economic growth and reducing the 
economic or social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised people’ (p.25) (also see Ellis et al., 2009; 
Gentilini and Omamo, 2011). Here we are concerned 
specifically with social protection measures that have 
been classed as ‘promotive’ (‘aim to enhance real incomes 
and capabilities…’) and ‘transformative’ (‘seek to address 
concerns of social justice and exclusion…’) (Sabates-
Wheeler and Devereux, 2007). 
Given that the majority of the poor in Africa live in 
rural areas and are involved to some degree in agriculture 
and/or livestock production, and acknowledging the 
strong arguments that agriculture provides the obvious 
route to broad-based, pro-poor growth, the links between 
social protection and agricultural growth have received 
some considerable attention (Farrington et al., 2004; 
Dorward et al., 2006; Dorward et al., 2009; Sabates-
Wheeler et al., 2009; Sumberg and Sabates-Wheeler, 
2011). Farrington et al. (2004) reviewed the potential 
complementarities between different social protection 
measures (i.e. cash transfers, subsidised or free food, 
subsidised or free inputs, employment generation and 
financial services) and agriculture. They concluded that 
while the scope for synergy between social protection 
and agriculture is limited, ‘there is substantial unexploited 
scope for introducing the perspectives of the one into 
the design and implementation of the other, i.e. for giving 
aspects of SP [social protection] more of a growth-
promoting dimension, and for designing agriculture 
initiatives in ways that aim to reduce risk and vulnerability’ 
(p.v). Dorward et al. (2009) reviewed the links between 
social protection and agriculture in Malawi and highlight 
the complexity of these linkages and the large number 
of factors determining related outcomes. Reflecting this 
complexity they concluded that ‘a mix of complementary 
social protection, agricultural and wider economic and 
institutional policies across different sectors are needed 
for effective promotion of short, medium and long term 
social protection, agricultural and non-agricultural devel-
opment, and poverty reduction’ (p.23). Similarly, Sumberg 
and Sabates-Wheeler (2011) were cautious about ‘home-
grown school feeding’ which is now being widely 
promoted as a ‘win-win’ social protection and agricultural 
development model. The main conclusion that emerges 
from this literature is that while opportunities for comple-
mentarily exist, social protection measures should not 
be seen as an easy or direct route to agricultural 
development.
Graduation in social protection discourse 
and programmes
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2011) provide a detailed 
review of the origins and theoretical underpinnings of 
the concept of graduation and how it is being opera-
tionalised in social protection programmes in SSA. Chirwa 
et al. (2011) explore the concept of graduation in the 
context of farm input subsidy programmes in Malawi. 
We will not cover this same ground here. What is impor-
tant is that Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux argue that 
judging graduation simply on the basis of an individual 
or household having passing a specific threshold (e.g. 
number of months in a social protection programme; or 
the accumulation of a pre-defined level or array of assets) 
does not do justice to the complexity or the heteroge-
neity of livelihoods. Depending on the household, 
context and so on – what Chirwa et al. (2011) call ‘the 
potential graduation conditions’ – the fact of passing 
any such threshold may be quite unrelated to key liveli-
hood outcomes such as improved food security or 
well-being. 
As an alternative Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux argue 
for what they call ‘sustainable graduation’ defined as ‘the 
ability of the household to remain above the benchmark 
in the medium- to long-term via a transformed livelihood’. 
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Here graduation is linked explicitly to the notion of 
‘promotive’ and ‘transformative’ social protection 
measures – indeed in one sense graduation is the confir-
mation of a successful transformation. As opposed to 
passing a common threshold, sustainable graduation 
implies that there has been some fundamental and 
lasting change in a household or a livelihood. Perhaps 
the critical point here is the recognition that this kind of 
fundamental change – and the sustainability of the asso-
ciated improved outcomes – may require changes other 
than simply an increase in specific assets. Thus, asset-
based social protection may only be transformative 
where social, market and environmental conditions are 
conducive. Such a conception of graduation better 
reflects the dynamics of livelihood change. The difference 
between the threshold and sustainable graduation 
approaches can be seen along two dimensions. The first 
dimension is time, where livelihoods must have changed 
enough that they are resilient to moderate shocks, thus 
highlighting the ‘sustainable’ nature of the graduation. 
The second dimension is agency, with graduation being 
seen as either a passive (‘she was graduated’) or an active 
(‘she graduated’) process. In the first instance, once the 
beneficiary passes a given threshold, the programme 
declares that she has graduated; in the second, the gradu-
ation reflects real change in the beneficiary’s livelihood 
(in effect she graduated herself with the help of the social 
protection programme).
Intriguingly Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2011) 
refer to assets in relation to individuals, households and 
communities, but provide little additional detail: the 
relationships between assets that are transferred, held 
and/or controlled at these various levels are never theo-
rised or explored. How does where an asset sits (e.g. 
individual, household or community) affect its use (or 
the efficiency of its use), particularly when its transforma-
tive potential is realised only when it is combined with 
other assets? How might the web of asset use, ownership 
and control be affected by a social protection interven-
tion and in turn affect graduation processes? 
For example, the transfer of a dairy heifer to a poor 
woman may be necessary to get her established as a 
milk producer, but it is unlikely to be sufficient. She may 
need to negotiate access to other assets including land 
for grazing or feed production, timber and know-how 
for shed construction, and access to water, training, credit 
etc. Some of these negotiations will take place within 
her household, others within her larger kin group, 
producers’ group or community. In any case, the specific 
conditions of access that she is able to negotiate may be 
less than optimal and thus have a material effect on the 
viability of the fledgling dairy enterprise. This may be 
especially so in situations where the additional assets 
she requires access to are particularly scarce and when 
the new enterprise threatens to upset established power 
relations.
Livestock as livelihoods 
assets
It is commonly said that domestic livestock, from poultry 
to camels, play a special role in African rural livelihoods 
(LID, 1999; Alary et al., 2011). As livelihood assets livestock 
can be a source of nutritious food and/or income (e.g. 
from the sale of milk, meat, eggs or young-stock) and 
capital growth (through increased body weight and 
reproduction). In areas where banking services and insur-
ance are limited, the importance of livestock as a form 
of savings (‘walking banks’ or ‘savings banks on the hoof’) 
is often highlighted. In times of climatic stress in dry areas, 
sale of stock serves as a coping mechanism which helps 
smooth consumption (cf. Fafchamps et al., 1998) and in 
the case of small-stock, protecting people’s ability to 
recover as conditions improve by sparing their larger 
animals. In addition, the suggestion is commonly made 
that small-stock including poultry, goats and sheep are 
particularly important for women, even poor women, in 
that women frequently control decision-making over 
their disposal, the animals may be kept within the 
domestic sphere, and they are less valuable financially 
so do not attract the attention of men (Kryger et al., 2008; 
Okali, 2011). Small-stock can be quickly and easily turned 
into cash (in contrast, large-stock such as cattle and 
camels are often described as ‘lumpy’ assets). Thinking 
along these lines has resulted in small-stock being central 
to many women’s economic empowerment and asset-
building projects (de Haan, 2001; Peacock, 2005). On the 
other hand, small-stock might be seen as a risky asset 
for women since they are likely to be the first animals to 
be sold when a household comes under stress. Beyond 
economics and gender dynamics, livestock can play criti-
cally important roles in identity, social dynamics and 
culture.
The consideration of livestock as a livelihood asset 
becomes more complicated when the category ‘livestock’ 
is broken down into particular species, age and sex 
combinations. These combinations determine the type 
and time-frame of potential benefit flows (immature 
animals may not produce any benefits for several years; 
a male animal on its own will not reproduce; shorter 
gestation periods and multiple births drive different 
growth dynamics across species). 
Further, to realise these potential benefits animals 
must have access to feed and water; they may require 
land, housing, tending, breeding and veterinary services; 
and there must be functional markets for sales and 
re-stocking. In other words – and again depending on 
the species and management system – the benefits asso-
ciated with livestock as a livelihood asset may require 
significant outlays (of labour, other resources and/or 
cash) and management skills. Morbidity and mortality 
are two factors that can greatly reduce the actual benefits 
derived from owning livestock. In some situations small-
stock may be valued precisely because they place lesser 
demands on land and labour.
As our interest is in livestock in relation to models of 
graduation from a position where social protection is 
required to assure e.g. food security, a closer analysis of 
the savings and capital growth functions is warranted. 
The story of livestock as a savings mechanism has two 
parts. The first, which is far and away the most common, 
portrays livestock as a store or stock of savings, similar 
to a simple savings account. New animals represent 
deposits; growth is the earned interest; and the consump-
tion, sale or death of animals represent the withdrawals. 
In areas without reliable and accessible banking services 
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the value of this savings function is beyond doubt; on 
the other hand, in some situations these ‘walking banks’ 
have been associated with what some have interpreted 
as less than optimal stocking levels (a large number of 
animals in relatively poor condition) and low off-take 
rates.
The second element of the story stresses flows of 
savings as opposed to stocks. The fact that livestock 
require continual investment in the form of feed and 
care over some considerable time before production or 
reproduction takes place (depending on species, produc-
tion system etc) means that livestock ownership can be 
seen as a kind of daily, forced savings scheme. However, 
nothing is guaranteed: the moment the daily deposits 
stop, the value of the accumulated savings pot is at risk. 
Age, disease and market conditions can also affect the 
value of the accumulated savings; death can quickly 
reduce it to zero. 
What, if anything, is special about the ‘asset-ness’ of 
livestock?  First they are living organisms with an inherent 
growth dynamic but at the same time, a limited life span. 
In this way they are more akin to assets like economic 
trees than a bar of gold bullion. Second, as discussed 
above, livestock require continual investment – at one 
level for maintenance and at a higher level to support 
growth, production and/or re-production. Again the 
analogy with economic trees seems apt, but an asset like 
a piece of machinery may also need periodic mainte-
nance and upgrading. Third, unlike economic trees, live-
stock are mobile and can be lost or stolen. Fourth, some 
livestock have additional value when they are in combi-
nation with others: two oxen may be needed for 
ploughing; a ram increases the value of a ewe in that 
both are required for reproduction. Here there is a useful 
analogy with machinery, where having the right combi-
nation of different machines increases the value of each 
individual machine. Fifth, there are significant global 
health concerns associated with the cross-border move-
ment of livestock and livestock products: ‘interests’ in 
livestock assets can go beyond those of individuals or 
households, and sometimes to the detriment of the poor 
(e.g. the case of Swine Fever in Haiti and/or Avian Flu in 
Asia). This is not the case with either trees or machinery. 
Sixth, small-stock such as sheep and goats can be an 
invaluable social asset for the poor as they allow them 
to participate in social events (like religious and birth 
ceremonies) that demonstrate membership and 
belonging. Finally, there may be significant social and 
psychological relationships among livestock and 
between livestock and people that would not develop 
with other kinds of assets. 
Much that is written about social protection and 
graduation assumes that assets can be denominated by 
cash, so the emphasis is on the scale and size of the 
transfer rather than the nature or type of the asset being 
transferred. Our argument is that with livestock assets, 
nature or type is all important. Poultry are not small goats, 
and goats are not small cattle. Despite the long tradition 
of reducing a camel, a head of cattle, a sheep and a goat 
into 1.0, 0.7, 0.1 and 0.1 ‘Tropical Livestock Unit’ (TLUs) 
respectively, in terms of their asset-ness and their poten-
tial role in graduation processes, the differences between 
these are far more than quantitative.
Heifer-in-trust as social 
protection
In this section we introduce the heifer-in-trust model 
which has been widely used by NGOs and others as a 
basis for poverty focused livestock interventions. It is 
important to note that in the main projects based on 
this model were (are) not described in terms of ‘social 
protection’, similarly, they made (make) no explicit refer-
ence to graduation. Nevertheless, as will become clear 
these projects have much in common with what are now 
understood as social protection interventions, and the 
idea of flock or herd growth has a particular resonance 
with the notion of graduation.
Heifer-in-trust projects
We use the term heifer-in-trust (also referred to as ‘live-
stock-in-kind credit’) to refer to a whole genre of projects 
that aim primarily at building-up the productive asset 
base of poor people. While there are many variations, 
heifer-in-trust projects are essentially rotating, in-kind 
loan schemes based on in-kind repayment. Typically a 
project will transfer one or more female animals to 
someone on the understanding that over time a specified 
number of female offspring will be returned to the project 
so they can be passed on to other beneficiaries (this is 
sometimes referred to as ‘the pass on system’). Until the 
repayments are complete the original animals are ‘owned’ 
by the project ‘in trust’ for the beneficiaries and after 
repayment they become the property of the beneficiaries 
to do with as they please. Similar to other micro-credit 
models, many heifer-in-trust projects are designed to 
work through groups and therefore have additional 
group formation and empowerment objectives.3
The heifer-in-trust projects implemented by NGOs and 
others across Africa differ along six important 
dimensions:
•	 Targeting and selection of beneficiaries: definition 
and identification of ‘poor’; minimum requirements 
in terms of availability or establishment of a suitable 
shed and fodder supply; prior knowledge or experi-
ence with livestock
•	 Species: poultry (chickens and ducks), goats, sheep 
and cattle
•	 Number loaned: 1–3 depending on species (e.g. 
seldom more than one for cattle)
•	 Number to be repaid: 1–3 depending on species
•	 Actions if loaned animal dies before repayment: 
variable, but usually no attempt to force repayment
•	 Additional services available through project: 
credit, technical training, group support, marketing
Some of these dimensions have important implica-
tions for the ability of heifer-in-trust projects to deliver 
social protection benefits, and perhaps none more so 
that the choice of species. Three chicks that are allowed 
to wonder around the compound freely, are occasional 
fed kitchen scraps but provided with little other ‘manage-
ment’ is a very different proposition from a dairy heifer 
kept permanently in a stall and which, when mature, will 
require considerable quantities of water, fodder and 
purchased concentrate feed, in additional to daily milking 
and careful management of breeding and health. Clearly 
the heifer is potentially the more valuable asset, having 
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the ability to produce a significant income stream. 
However, the physical, financial and management inputs 
required in order to realise these benefits are such that 
they may be beyond the grasp of those most in need of 
social protection. A heifer (or indeed a pair of dairy goats) 
placed in the wrong environment or with individuals 
who do not have the means to support, may be more of 
a liability than as asset.
The fact that heifer-in-trust projects are built around 
a model of rotating, in-kind loans has been used to justify 
claims of sustainability. If substantiated through project 
experience, these claims have important implications as 
they would help dispel the sense that social protection 
programmes must be, by their very nature, a continuous 
burden on either government or donor funds. The 
sustainability of any rotating loan scheme is sensitive to 
the balance between the interest charged and the default 
rate. The case of heifer-in-trust is however somewhat 
more complicated. As shown by Afifi-Affat (1998) the 
critical variables in the schemes are: the number of 
animals repaid per animal received (in effect the interest 
rate); the survival rates of adult animals and their 
offspring; and the reproductive performance of the 
adults. With inexperienced livestock keepers, morbidity 
and mortality would be expected to be high and repro-
ductive performance low. Based on a simple modelling 
exercise Afifi-Affat demonstrated that for schemes 
involving cattle, if repayment of only one calf is required 
they are unlikely to be sustainable at the scheme level; 
but if the repayment requirement increases to two, 
sustainability at the participant level is unlikely. However, 
insurance arrangements could potentially be used to 
overcome these problems.
Case study 1: Dairy goats in Kenya and 
Ethiopia
The NGO Farm-Africa has been involved in small-scale 
goat development in East Africa since 1988, and this work 
provides one of the best documented examples of the 
use of the heifer-in-trust approach (or what Farm-Africa 
refer to as ‘goat credit’) (Ayele and Peacock, 2003; Ahuya 
et al., 2005; Peacock, 2005; Dennis et al., 2008; Peacock, 
2008; Peacock and Sherman, 2010). 
While the term social protection is not used in relation 
to this work, the objectives – asset building, improved 
nutrition, increased income – resonate strongly with 
social protection discourse, as do the stated target 
groups: ‘particularly vulnerable households’, ‘the poorest 
of the poor’, ‘those affected by HIV/AIDS’ and ‘households 
headed by women’ (Peacock, 2008). 
The approach has evolved over the years and more 
recently was formalised into a nine step ‘Goat Model’ 
(Peacock, 2008). Goat credit is only one (optional) 
element of the model, with other components including 
group formation and development, training (of imple-
menters and beneficiaries), community-based animal 
health and breed improvement. In some locations benefi-
ciaries have had access to a micro-credit fund and were 
helped to start e.g. back-yard poultry enterprises (Ayele 
and Peacock, 2003).
In Ethiopia the goat credit component involved giving 
two female goats to selected women who were then 
expected to return two kids (Peacock, 2005). Ayele and 
Peacock (2003) suggest ‘it is not uncommon to see 100% 
of such repayments made within 2 years’ (as a result, in 
part, of ‘peer pressure’); while Peacock (2005) asserts that 
these kinds of schemes ‘can be self-administered by even 
illiterate people and the revolving fund managed in this 
way is “inflation-proof” and can increase and multiply 
benefits very widely with repaid stock lent to new 
members’.
In terms of impact, some quite dramatic claims are 
made. Ayele and Peacock (2003) report increased milk 
consumption, income generation, investment in produc-
tivity enhancing crop technology, higher crop yields, 
asset creation and ‘up to 20% of the households have 
moved into ownership of cattle, generally cows’. Even 
more impressive is the claim that participating farmers 
experienced approximately a 10-fold increase in both 
annual income (from $93 to $995) and the value of goat 
assets (from $156 to $918) (Peacock, 2008, citing Laker 
and Omore (2004)).4  One constraint to the up-scaling of 
these efforts is the ‘misplaced disease concerns’ on the 
part of some African governments which have stopped 
the importation of European breeding stock which is 
central to breed improvement efforts (Peacock and 
Sherman, 2010). 
Case study 2: Dairy cattle in Tanzania5
Since 1973 the heifer-in-trust approach has also been 
used by churches, NGOs and government in an effort to 
develop the small-holder dairy sector in Tanzania. The 
target group is variously described as ‘those who could 
not afford to purchase a heifer on their own’ (Rugambwa 
et al., 1995), ‘low income farmers’ (Mkenda-Mugittu, 2003) 
and ‘resource-poor farmers, especially women’ (Kurwijila, 
2001); with the objectives of protecting and increasing 
income, alleviating malnutrition and poverty and 
creating and/or strengthening self-reliant grassroots 
farmers’ groups (Kabumbuli and Phelan, 2003).
As the feed, water and management requirements for 
even a single dairy cow can be substantial, prerequisites 
or conditions for participation are common. These may 
include undergoing a capability assessment, the prepara-
tion of a zero grazing unit (shed plus covered compost 
pit), planting a specified area of fodder, training and 
agreeing to keep records (Kurwijila, 2001; Kabumbuli and 
Phelan, 2003; Bayer and Kapunda, 2006). Kabumbuli and 
Phelan (2003) suggest that these conditions can lead to 
discrimination against the poorest; nevertheless, without 
them the project would be bound to fail. In any case, the 
poorest can benefit ‘from increased employment oppor-
tunities in the area and from the increased availability 
of a very good nutrition source, i.e. milk’. Others have 
suggested that where land and fodder are abundant 
‘able-bodied poor people’ can easily enter into the dairy 
business through these schemes (Bayer and Kapunda, 
2006).
Projects have generally provided one or two pregnant 
cross-bred heifers to farmers on the understanding that 
either one or two in-calf (i.e. pregnant) heifers must be 
returned for each original animal (Rugambwa et al., 1995; 
Bayer and Kapunda, 2006). Some projects have passed 
one of the repaid heifers to another farmer with the 
second being sold by the project to cover expenses. 
Because of the value of the cattle and the level of 
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management required, most projects have provided 
technical assistance and continuous monitoring, which 
might cost as much as 40% of what the producers receive 
for their milk (Rutamu and Munster, 1998, cited by 
Kurwijila 2001).
Repayment rates have been variable and generally 
low. In one experience in Kagera region 32 heifers were 
passed on from 56 original animals, with an overall repay-
ment rate of 44%; in another 244 heifers were passed-on 
from 1,286 original animals, with an overall repayment 
rate of 21% (Houterman et al., 1993). Houterman et al. 
(1993) concluded that the pass-on system was slow and 
estimated that it took ‘approximately 10 years to produce 
100 pass on pregnant heifers from 100 credit (HIT) heifers’. 
Data for the period 1980 – 1992 from Kagera and Tanga 
regions was summarised by Kurwijila (2001): 1,463 
farmers received a total of 1,593 heifers, 80 of which died 
or were stolen or slaughtered and 21 were withdrawn. 
In total, 205 pass-on heifers were either produced or paid 
(13% of the total originally lent). Nevertheless he 
concluded that a repayment (pass-on) rate of 60–70% 
can be achieved with good monitoring.
According to Bayer and Kapunda (2006) the impacts 
on participating households can be ‘spectacular’. After 
3–6 years some families that had previously been on the 
edge of survival were considered wealthy; some 
improved their houses; increased their cropped area; dug 
wells; purchased additional dairy cattle; and sent their 
children to secondary school. Other reported impacts 
include improved relationships between husbands and 
wives; strengthened economic and political role of 
women; and creation of jobs for poorer people. Strong 
farmer groups and nearness to markets were identified 
as keys to success.
Despite these claims of success, a number of concerns 
have been raised. Kabumbuli and Phelan (2003) suggest 
that the farmers who benefited from these schemes tend 
to be better educated, have more land and have a higher 
tendency to send children to school. In other words, there 
would seem to be a contradiction between the stated 
objectives of helping the poorest and the characteristics 
of the actual participants. On the other hand, because 
of the demands of a dairy cow it is clear that dairying, 
even at a very small scale, it may not be an appropriate 
enterprise for those with very limited resources.6  The 
gender strategies and impacts of the various heifer-in-
trust dairy programmes in Tanzania have received some 
attention (Okali, 2011). Some programmes specifically 
targeted women as recipients of animals in an effort to 
become more ‘gender sensitive’ and address gender 
equity concerns, although women recipients never seem 
to have been more than 20 percent. In any case, this 
strategy may have been flawed because many poor 
women do not have access to the land and other 
resources required. In addition, transforming a concern 
about gender into a focus on women takes no account 
of the complexity and flexibility of household and wider 
(gendered) social relations, and how these play out 
around potentially valuable interventions such as heifer-
in-trust for particular women, men and other family 
members.
Other issues include poor access to milk markets, the 
cost of veterinary services, ineffective artificial insemina-
tion and limited availability of feed and water (Kabumbuli 
and Phelan, 2003), leading Bebe (2008) to conclude that 
these schemes were ‘unsustainable for farmers and for 
projects’. 
Heifer-in-trust and graduation
Here we use ‘to graduate’ as an active verb so that gradu-
ation from social protection (1) is to a significant degree 
a function of the action and agency of the beneficiaries 
of social protection measures – i.e. they graduate them-
selves through their own actions aided by social protec-
tion intervention; (2) involves dynamics that are specific 
to particular contexts and individual and household 
circumstances; and (3) reflects a transformation such that 
social protection measures are no longer required in 
order to assure that food security and other livelihood 
needs are met despite the normal vagaries of the envi-
ronment, markets, health and so on.
In theory, heifer-in-trust programmes can promote 
this type of graduation by providing benefit streams 
including nutritious food, income and asset growth. 
However, different livestock species, management 
systems and project contexts will produce different 
benefit possibilities over different time frames. For 
example, small-stock including some breeds of goats 
and sheep will not produce a constant source of income 
or nutrition in the form of milk. 
In general we can surmise that:
•	 the poorer or more vulnerable the beneficiary, the 
deeper and more sustained the social protection inter-
vention will need to be in order to contribute to 
graduation;
•	 the more sophisticated, management intensive, 
market-linked or large-scale the intervention, the more 
Table 1. Requirements and risks associated with different social protection interventions.
Type of SP 
intervention
Requirements Risks
Cash transfer Access to markets in which to purchase desired 
goods / services and/or a secure savings mechanism
Loss, theft, dispersion
Subsidised fertiliser Land, labour, seed, market access (if not for own 
consumption)
Weather, crop pests, low 
market price
Heifer-in-trust Depending on species: feed, water, labour, veterinary 
services, breeding services, training, peer group, 
market access (if not for consumption)
Morbidity, mortality, theft, poor 
reproductive performance, 
weather, low market price 
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important accompanying measures (training, credit 
etc) and close monitoring will be; 
•	 the longer the period before meaningful benefits 
begin to appear, the more difficult it will be for poor 
people to use the intervention for successful 
graduation;
•	 the less that the financial demands and risks associated 
with the intervention are offset by accompanying 
activities (training, monitoring, micro-credit, insur-
ance), the more difficult it will be for poor people to 
use the intervention for successful graduation
Thus in any situation where project resources are 
constrained there is a set of trade-offs between the trans-
formative potential of the intervention, the type and level 
of accompanying measures required to assure success 
and the number of potential beneficiaries.
Taken at face value the reported impacts of the Farm-
Africa goat model – including increased investment in 
productivity enhancing crop technology and asset 
creation – seem to point to what could be considered 
graduation. However, a much closer analysis of the initial 
circumstances of the participants, the distribution of 
these positive outcomes and the costs associated with 
the accompanying measures and close monitoring is 
certainly warranted.
How is the graduation story via heifer-in-trust different 
from those of graduation via cash transfers or subsidised 
fertiliser?  For one thing, what is required in order to get 
Table 2. Contrainers, enablers and sustainers of graduation in relation to heifer-in-trust 
interventions. 
Constrainer Enabler Sustainer
Programme-specific
Low repayment rates Peer pressure Profitability of livestock activity
High cost of contact Group formation / strengthening
Livestock morbidity Access to veterinary  services Profitability of livestock activity
Limited genetic potential 
of stock
Systematic upgrading programme
Access to AI services
Profitability of livestock activity
Poor reproductive 
performance
Training
Access to AI services
Profitability of livestock activity
Theft / death Insurance Profitability of livestock activity
Emergency sales Micro-credit Profitability of livestock activity
Beneficiary-specific
Lack of interest / motivation Interest / motivation as selection criteria Consistent & attractive flow of 
benefits
Lack of knowledge / skill in 
stock management / 
marketing
Training
Limited quantity and/or 
quality of feed / water
Adequate availability as selection criteria
Micro-credit
Profitability of livestock activity
Limited cash to purchase 
inputs
Adequate cash as selection criteria
Micro-credit
Savings schemes
Consistent profitability of 
livestock activity
Appropriation of income / 
assets by other household 
members
Peer / social pressure
Education
Empowerment
Market-specific
Low prices or thin markets 
for animals & livestock 
products
Access to larger markets
Value added
Urbanisation, rising incomes & 
changing consumption patterns
Environment-specific
Seasonal variation in feed/ 
water availability
Year-round availability as a selection 
criteria
Irrigation development
Well / borehole / dam development
Profitability of livestock activity
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value from each is different, as are the risks (Table 1). It 
seems clear that a successful livestock intervention – 
particularly if it involves dairy goats or cattle – has signifi-
cantly more, and more complex requirements, and is 
subject to a wider array of risks. Of course it is also about 
the respective values of the cash transfer, fertiliser subsidy 
or livestock: but on a pound for pound basis is one of 
these a better graduation investment than the others?
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2011) develop an 
analysis of ‘enablers’ and ‘constrainers’ of asset-based 
graduation, highlighting the market context; local and 
household initial conditions; scale and coverage of trans-
fers; household-level incentives and dependency; and 
environmental conditions. Here we build on their 
approach by identifying four categories of constrainers, 
enablers and sustainers to graduation in relation to 
heifer-in-trust interventions: programme-specific, bene-
ficiary-specific, market-specific and environment-specific 
(Table 2). Constrainers are the problems or issues that 
heifer-in-trust programmes regularly confront and that, 
if not dealt with effectively, limit programme impact; 
enablers are the common programme responses to these 
constrainers; while sustainers have the potential to 
sustain changes brought about by enablers. It is impor-
tant to stress that depending on species, management 
system, context etc, come of these constrainers, enablers 
and sustainers will be more important than others. 
Nevertheless, the importance of profitability as a 
sustainer cuts across all livestock activities with transfor-
mative potential.
Conclusions and implica-
tions for empirical work
From this review we conclude that in principle the heifer-
in-trust approach has considerable potential as a promo-
tive social protection measure. We also conclude that 
the asset-ness of livestock may in principle allow them 
to make a unique contribution to a dynamic of livelihood 
transformation that in turn allows beneficiaries to grad-
uate themselves from a position of requiring social 
protection.
These general conclusions must however be heavily 
qualified, as the actual outcomes associated with heifer-
in-trust programmes are dependent on a wide array of 
considerations ranging from beneficiary selection 
criteria, through the livestock species and breeds distrib-
uted, to local environmental and market conditions. 
Perhaps most problematic is the fact that one 
characteristic of the asset-ness of livestock – that they 
are alive, growing and reproducing – creates significant 
and continual demands for feed, water, management 
and veterinary services, and implies significant risk associ-
ated with morbidity and mortality. While some heifer-
in-trust programmes create mechanisms to reduce initial 
costs and mitigate risk, there appears to be a fundamental 
tension between the conditions and circumstances asso-
ciated with a need for promotive social protection 
measures on the one hand, and the requirements for 
successful – livelihood transforming – livestock produc-
tion on the other. In other words, while livestock may 
have great potential to transform livelihoods, it is the 
most obvious target group for promotive social protec-
tion measures that is least likely to be in a position to 
handle the demands and risks associated with livestock 
assets.
On the basis of this analysis a number of empirical 
questions merit further investigation: 
1. What is the evidence that heifer-in-trust programmes 
have allowed people in need of social protection to 
transform their livelihoods on a sustainable basis – to 
graduate?
2. What combinations of programme characteristics, 
targeting strategies and contexts are associated with 
evidence of sustainable graduation through 
heifer-in-trust? 
3. What individual, intra-household and inter-household 
dynamics are associated with evidence of sustainable 
graduation through heifer-in-trust?  When is sustain-
able graduation a group or community affair?
4. What are the implications for our thinking about asset-
based livelihood transformation when assets that 
need to be worked together are transferred, held or 
controlled by different people, households or groups?
Finally, when analysing the operation and impacts of 
heifer-in-trust programmes from a graduation perspec-
tive it will be important to be mindful of both positive 
and negative unintended consequences. On the positive 
side, the income and capital growth associated with 
successful livestock production might be used to invest 
in new or innovative economic activities, or in ways that 
are not obviously ‘productive’ but nevertheless transfor-
mative. On the negative side, closer association with 
livestock may result in increased risk, both financial (e.g. 
from an epidemic) and health-related (e.g. from zoonotic 
diseases).
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End Notes 
1 Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 6SN, UK
2 Centre d´Etudes, de Documentation et de Recherche Economiques et sociales (CEDRES), 
03 BP 7210, Ouagadougou 03, Burkina Faso
3 A group-based variant is the so-called ‘livestock bank’ (Begg and Santos, 2010).
4 We note that Laker and Omore (2004) provide no data which supports this claim.
5 This review does not take account of unpublished project evaluations etc.
6 This same argument can be made for any intensive livestock production activity – see Sumberg (1998) and 
Nymarunda and Sumberg (1998) in relation to poultry and dairy respectively.
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